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TAX CONFERENCE

Appendix
RECENT VIRGINIA TAX DEVELOPMENTS
BY WILLIAM L.S. ROWE
I.

PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS.

A. Limited proceduralrights prior to 1980.
1. Regulations - Only sales and use tax regulations and a handful
of income tax circulars published. No opportunity for public comment.
2. Refund actions - Administrative remedies limited to claim
for refund and informal "appeals conference" with State Tax Commissioner.
Court challenge limited to refund action following payment of the tax.
3. Burdens ofproof - Taxpayer faced extremely difficult burdens of proof and adverse rules of statutory construction.
a. The tax collector's assessment is prima facie correct.
Commonwealth v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc. 216 Va. 686, 689, 222 S.E.2d
526, 528-29 (1976).
b. Exemptions from taxation are strictly construed. Va.
Const. art. X, § 6(f). When a statute is subject to two possible constructions,
one granting the exemption and another not granting it, court will follow
construction that denies exemption. Commonwealth v. Community Motor Bus
Co., 214 Va. 155, 157, 198 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1973).
c. Construction of a statute by a State official charged
with its administration is entitled to great weight. Department of Taxation v.
ProgressiveCommunity Club of Washington County, Va., Inc., 215 Va. 732,
739, 213 S.E. 2d 759, 763 (1975). Administrative interpretations could be
proved by published regulations, private letter rulings, and even oral testimony
of taxing officials.
d. Taxpayer faced with long practical odds in the Virginia
Supreme Court losing 69% of State tax cases over 35 years and 92% in the
years 1973-1978.
B. The Income Tax Allocation Cases:Commonwealth v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 220 Va. 981, 265 S.E.2d 720 (1980).
1. Supreme Court decision involved three separate suits all
turning on whether Virginia's allocation and apportionment statutes follow
distinction of Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act between
business and nonbusiness income. Department of Taxation asserted that statutes should be construed to imply such a distinction and argued long-standing,
consistent administrative interpretation supported the result. Department's
interpretation was established by oral testimony, tax instructions published
after tax years in question, and "confirming" statutes enacted after tax years
in question.
a. Champion - Timber gains treated as capital gains for
federal tax purposes under I.R.C. §§ 631 & 1231 are allocated to the state of

TAX CONFERENCE

situs for tax purposes. Unpublished administrative interpretations not entitled
to "great weight." Id. at 992-93, 265 S.E.2d at 726-27.
b. Weaver Bros. - Interest income allocated to corporation's principal place of business. Administrative interpretation embodied
in unpublished regulation not entitled to great weight. Id. at 993-94, 265
S.E.2d at 727.
c. Merrill Lynch - Dividend and interest income allocated to corporation's principal place of business. Tax instructions published
after year in question not controlling especially since instructions not consistent with legislative history, wording of statute, and prior administrative
interpretation. Id. at 995-96, 265 S.E.2d at 728-29.
2. Court's rejection of Department's attempted retroactive application of changed administrative interpretation indicates that only published
regulations will be accorded the "great weight" given by previous decisions
to opinions of State Tax Commissioner.
C.

Procedurallegislation.

1. State Tax Law Revision Task Force Report, prepared by the
Tax Committees of the Virginia Bar Association, Virginia Society of Certified
Public Accountants, and the Virginia State Bar, leads to Report of the Practices
and Procedures in the Collection and Administration of State Taxes Study
Committee, H. Doc. No. 30 (1980), recommending establishment of Virginia
Tax Court and making Department of Taxation subject to Administrative
Process Act.
2. House Bill No. 990 (1980) effected sweeping revisions in
Virginia tax procedures. 1980 Va. Acts, ch. 633.
a. Regulations - State Tax Commissioner given broad
authority to issue rulings and regulations subject to Administrative Process
Act. Va. Code § 58-48.6 (Supp. 1981).
(1) Department of Taxation required to publish ruling
letters and circuit court opinions in tax cases. Va. Code § 58-48.7 (Supp.
1981).
(2) Weight accorded administrative interpretation
specified by statute. Va. Code § 58-48.8 (Supp. 1981).
(a) After 1984 - Only published materials
admissible into evidence, and only regulations promulgated after opportunity
for public comment accorded "great weight."
(b) Transition rules in effect until 1985.
(1) All regulations published after June
30, 1980 subject to Administrative Process Act.
(2) "Documented" administrative interpretations established as in effect prior to July 1, 1980 are admissible into
evidence and given "such weight as the reviewing authority deems appropriate."
(a) Forst v. Rockingham Poultry
Marketing Coop., 222 Va. 270, 279 S.E.2d 400 (1981). In construing statute
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to deny cooperative exemption from State capital taxation, Court held that
"any provision granting an immunity from taxes, whether called an exclusion,
limitation or exemption, is narrowly construed." Id. at 276, 279 S.E.2d at
403. Private letter ruling to one of taxpayers in 1954 asserting its liability for
the tax, followed by payment of tax for number of years, held to be longstanding consistent administrative interpretation to be accorded "great weight."
(b) County of Henrico v. Management Recruiters, Inc., 221 Va. 1004, 277 S.E.2d 163 (1981). Ordinance
taxing "a furnisher of domestic or clerical help, labor or employment" held
to require license of an employment agency, 80% of whose business was the
placement of job applicants in permanent managerial positions. Although
statute was to be strictly construed against the locality because it imposed a
tax and did not grant an exemption, unchallenged testimony by license supervisor that ordinance had been applied consistently for 20 years to similar
businesses by County and other localities under similar ordinances held to be
long-standing, consistent administrative interpretation entitled to "great weight"
Id. at 1010-11, 277 S.E.2d at 167.
(c) City of Richmond v. VNB Mortgage Corp. Cir. Ct. City of Richmond (Div. I) (January 23, 1980) (Walker,
J.), appeal denied (October 2, 1980). 1975 ordinance, effective January 1,
1976, taxing "mortgage brokers" not applicable to corporation making, selling and servicing mortgage loans, i.e., "mortgage banker." Ordinances of
other localities much more specific than "mortgage brokers." No "mortgage
banker" had ever paid Richmond tax voluntarily. City council rejected 1973
ordinance subjecting mortgage bankers to tax.
(d)

Conclusion -

Except in cases

in which specific statutory rules apply, weight to be given administrative
interpretations is a factual issue that depends on public knowledge (i.e., quality
and quantity of publication), consistency of application, evidence of legislative
acquiescence and intent, reasonableness of the interpretation, and equities.
(c) Discovery of all facts concerning administrative interpretations is critical. Discovery is available in state tax refund
actions brought under Va. Code § 58-1130 (Supp. 1981), which declares that
"the proceedings shall be conducted as an action at law, subject to the Rules
of Court." See also United Airlines, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Cir. Ct. City
of Richmond (Div. I) (April, 1975) (Sands, J.), aff d in part and rev'd in
partwithout consideringdiscovery issue, 219 Va. 374, 248 S.E.2d 124 (1978)
(on motion by the Commonwealth, discovery procedures under Part Four of
the Rules of Court held applicable to special statutory refund action brought
prior to amendment to § 58-1130 that specifically subjects such actions to Rules
of Court). Discovery also should be available in local tax actions under § 581145, except in real estate cases involving less than $100,000 of valuation.
See Va. Code § 58-1145 (Supp. 1981).
b. Revenue rulings - Are they reliable?
(1) Commonwealth v. Washington Gas Light Co.,
221 Va. 315, 269 S.E.2d 820 (1980). The State Corporation Commission
(SCC), sitting as a court and reviewing its own actions as tax administrator,
found that taxpayer had justifiably relied on ruling from the SCC and ordered
the refund of $241,000 assessed by staff after SCC revoked ruling retroac-
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tively. Supreme Court, without deciding whether equitable estoppel applies
in a Virginia tax case, reversed and held that taxpayer had not proved by
"clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence" justifiable reliance to its detriment. Id. at 324-326, 269 S.E.2d at 826-27.
(2) WGL has little practical effect on taxes administered by Department of Taxation. Va. Code § 58-48.6B (Supp. 1981), copied
from I.R.C. § 7805(b), allows the Commissioner to "prescribe the extent, if
any, to which any ruling or regulation shall be applied without retroactive
effect." See 26 Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(5).
(3) Would WGL result have occurred with any agency
except SCC, which was required under statutory procedures in effect when
suit was filed to exercise discretionary refund functions in judicial proceeding
in which Attorney General was made a party? See Va. Code § 58-1123 (1974)
(amended 1978).
c. Proceduralpitfalls - Clarified by House Bill 990.
(1) Except in jeopardy cases, taxes cannot be collected until the Commissioner makes a final determination concerning the
correctness of the assessment. Va. Code § 58-1119 (Supp. 1981).
(2) New protective claim for refund procedure permits taxpayer to toll statute of limitations by paying assessment and filing a
claim for refund. Va. Code § 58-1119.1 (Supp. 1981).
(3) Definitions clarified to give clear standing to sue
to retail merchants, who collect sales tax from customers and others, providing
they agree to pass refund on to their customers. Va. Code § 58-1117.20 (Supp.
1981).
(4) Department of Taxation prohibited from making
computer registered assessments. All assessments must be made in writing
and are effective when mailed to the taxpayer. Id.
(5) Court refund procedures clarified by adopting Rules
of Court and giving court jurisdiction to hear as one lawsuit case involving
tax divided between State and localities. Va. Code §§ 58-1130 & 58-1136.
(Supp. 1981).
(6) Statute of limitations increased to three years and
of assessment - i.e., date written notice is mailed
the
date
measured from
to taxpayer, not date registered on computer. Va. Code §§ 58-1130 & 581117.20 (Supp. 1981). (7)
Commissioner's right to demand
trial de novo
reduced from 6 months to 21 days. Va. Code § 58-1137 (Supp. 1981); see
Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Marketing Coop., 222 Va. 270, 274-75, 279
S.E.2d 400, 402-03 (1981) (upholding Commissioner's right to demand new
trial even after time for appeal expired).
d. Virginia Tax Court.
(1) Did not survive as part of House Bill 990 as finally
enacted.
(2) See generally Philipps, Virginia Tax Procedures: UnfinishedBusiness,
38 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1115 (1981) for interesting review of procedural
history and argument in favor of establishing a Virginia tax court.
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II.

Income Taxes.
A.

Champion fallout.

1. Department of Taxation will owe large refunds to many
multistate corporationsaudited during the years 1974-1980.
a. Refunds - Non-Virginia headquartered corporations
are most likely to benefit.
b. Double tax - Virginia headquartered corporations are
faced with double tax problem under MerrillLynch and Weaver Bros. since
interest and dividend income allocated to Virginia by Virginia but apportioned
by other states. Problem made worse if Department of Taxation reverses its
administrative interpretation that allocation applies only to net interest income,
thereby requiring Virginia headquartered corporations to allocate to Virginia
gross interest income and to deduct interest expenses from apportionable
income.
2. Senate Bill No. 641 (1981) completely revises Virginia allocation and apportionmentprocedures. 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 402.
(a) Mathias Bill - Virginia Tax Allocation
Cases reversed by Virginia General Assembly's adoption of Mathias Bill, S.
893, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-303, 351-361 (1979).
(i) All income taxable by apportionment
except dividends from less than 50% owned corporations. All other dividends
subtracted from taxable income. Va. Code §§ 58-151.032(g) & 58-151.037
(Supp. 1981).
(ii) Three factor apportionment formula
retained with changes. Sales factor now utilizes simple destination test without
any throwback. Compare Va. Code §§ 58-151.041-.048 with Va. Code §§ 58151.041-.048 (1974 & Supp. 1978) (amended in part 1981).
(b) Merrill Lynch and Weaver Bros. reversed
by clarification of Va. Code §58-151.050:1 taxing "financial corporations"
under a one factor cost of performance formula. Any corporation can be a
"financial corporation" if it receives 70% or more of its gross income from
interest, taxable dividends, securities transactions, and financial services. Va.
Code § 58-151.050:1 (Supp. 1981).
(c) Unitary business - Worldwide and nationwide apportionment rejected: Virginia is an international tax haven.
(i) National trend is to subject major corporations to tax by apportioning all unitary business income from both domestic and foreign sources. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980) (separate accounting for Wisconsin marketing
operations disallowed); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980) (tax on dividends received from foreign subsidiaries constitutionally included within Vermont's apportionable income).
(ii) Senate Bill 641 rejects taxation of all
foreign source income by deducting foreign dividend gross-up, Subpart F
income, and all "foreign source income" from Virginia taxable income. Va.
Code §58-151.013(c)(6), (8), & (9) (Supp. 1981). Three factor formula limits
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factors to property, payroll, or sales "effectively connected with the conduct
of a trade or business within the United States." Va. Code § 58-141.042-.048
(Supp. 1981). Worldwide consolidation or combination of income of affiliated
group of corporations prohibited. Va. Code §58-151.079:1 (Supp. 1981).
(d) Election - 1981 taxable year is an election year for purposes of corporations choosing to file separate, consolidated,
or "combined" tax returns. Department of Taxation may require pro forma
request for permission to change reporting method. Va. Code §58-151.079
(Supp. 1981). See also Va. Corp. Income Tax Circular No. 2 (May 9, 1978).
B. Pending Litigation - General Electric v. Commonwealth, Cir.
Ct. City of Richmond (Div. I) (Walker, J.).
1. Issue is whether income of a non-resident DISC is subject
to Virginia taxation by including its income with that of its parent corporation.
Stipulated facts are that GE DISC is a non-operating commission DISC that
does not do business in Virginia and is not subject to Virginia income tax.
2. Case will turn on meaning of Va. Code § 58-151.083 (1974),
which permits Department of Taxation to require a combined return when
"any arrangements exist in such a manner as to improperly reflect the business
done or the Virginia taxable income earned from business done in this State."
When a taxpayer enters into a transaction that is valid and proper under federal
law, is the Department of Taxation entitled to deem it "improper," notwithstanding Virginia's absolute conformity to federal tax law, if the effect is to
reduce the Virginia taxable income?
III.

Sales and Use Taxes.
A.

Miscellaneous legislation.

1. Homefuel - Fuel for domestic consumption exempted from
State tax with local option to exempt dealer sales. Va. Code §§ 58-441.6(gl)
& 58-441.49:3 (Supp. 1981); see Va. Tax Bulletin 81-20 (August 20, 1981).
2. Vending machines - Vending machine operators must report and pay tax (4% to state and 1% to locality) based on wholesale purchases.
Va. Code § 58-441.34 (Supp. 1981) (effective July 1, 1982).
3. Other - Numerous exemptions added or expanded in reaction to results produced by rule of strict construction.
B. Litigation - Cases begin to clarify scope of exemption for "machinery or tools ... or supplies, used directly in processing, manufacturing,
refining, mining or conversion of products for sale or resale." Va. Code § 58441.6 (Supp. 1981).
1. Processing- Department's narrow view that "manufacturing" and "processing" are synonymous terms rejected.
a. Commonwealth v. Orange-MadisonCoop. Farm Services, 220 Va. 655, 261 S.E.2d 532 (1980). Processing "merely requires that
or
the product undergo a treatment rendering the product more marketable
chemof
mixing
and
feed
make
to
additives
and
grains
of
useful." Blending
icals to make fertilizer held to be exempt processing. The fact products were.
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sold at retail and not wholesale was irrelevant. Id. at 658-59, 261 S.E.2d at
534-35.
b. Solite Corp. v. County of King George, 220 Va. 661,
261 S.E.2d 535 (1980) (local license tax case decided the same day as OrangeMadison Coop.). Crushing, blending and mixing of sand and stone held not
manufacturing. Manufacturing requires transformation of raw materials into
articles of substantially different character. Id. at 665, 261 S.E.2d at 537-38.
c. State Tax Commissioner v. Flow Research Animals,
Inc. 221 Va. 817, 273 S.E.2d 811 (1981) (two justices dissenting). Raising
laboratory animals in controlled environment for later resale held not exempt
processing. Processing requires application of some process, something more
than letting nature take its course. Id. at 820, 273 S.E.2d at 813.
2. Direct use - Direct use depends on determination of where
exempt activity begins and ends aihd what items are used as an integral part
of that activity. See Va. Code § 58-441.3(p) & (q).
(a) Commonwealth v. United Airlines, Inc.,
219 Va. 374, 248 S.E.2d 124 (1978). Ticket and reservation equipment,
baggage handling equipment, headrest covers on passenger seats, and antihijacking surveillance equipment were used directly in "common carder service." Id. at 385-87, 248 S.E.2d at 130-31. But cf. Commonwealth v. Community Motor Bus Co., 214 Va. 155, 159, 198 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1973)
(exempting only items needed to keep the buses on the road in rendition of
its "public service").
(b) Webster Brick Co. v. Department of Taxation, 219 Va. 81, 245 S.E.2d 252 (1978). Only items that are an immediate
part of production - on the assembly line - are used directly. Essential
items such as outside oil storage tanks, crane, tools used to repair equipment,
chemicals used to maintain equipment, and specially designed parts of building
are not exempt. Id. at 87-89, 245 S.E.2d at 256-57.
(c) Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Commonwealth,
Cir. Ct. Buchanan County (August 4, 1981) (Phillips, J.), pet. for appeal
filed by Commonwealth (November 4, 1981). Involves direct use exemptions
for mining and processing.
(i) Trial court held scales used to weigh
in coal trucks at processing plant were used directly in processing and found
that fine coal processing plant (a "tipple") was essentially a one purpose
machine so that concrete and steel used to erect tipple was sales tax exempt.
Question involves scope of direct use exemption - where "machine" begins
and ends.
(ii) Trial court held supplies used to reclaim strip mined lands, maintain and construct haul roads, and repair parts
for coal trucks were not used directly in mining. Trucking question involves
where "coal mining" begins and ends.
3. Nontaxable services - Distinction between taxable sales of
property and non-taxable rendition of services still uncertain.
a. WTAR Radio-TV Corp. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va.
877, 234 S.E.2d 245 (1977). Charges for creating commercial advertisement
broadcast over airwaves held taxable since "true object" of the buyer was
to buy completed film. Broadcasting over airwaves constituted taxable transfer
of possession. Id. at 883-84, 234 S.E.2d at 248-49.
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b. Designing Women, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Cir. Ct.
Arlington County (Feb. 24, 1978) (Duff, J.), appeal denied, 219 Va. lxv
(1978). The Treasurer of Virginia League of Women Voters, a candidate for
Commonwealth's Attorney, and the Clerk of the Circuit Court all testified
that their purpose in hiring the advertising agency was to obtain its design
skills and knowledge. Judge Duff held that "true object" of the buyers was
to obtain expertise and know-how, not tangible designs. Department's petition
for appeal was denied on procedural grounds.
c. Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc., v. Commonwealth,
Cir. Ct. City of Charlottesville (March 29, 1978) (Pickford, J.), appeal denied, 219 Va. lxv (1979). Monthly charges for UPI and AP wire news services
not taxable even though news stories were transmitted through tangible machines and displayed in printed form.
d. Department of Taxation Ruling dated May 14, 1981,
Va. State & Loc. Taxes (P-H) 23,081. Charges for pager communication
service held tax exempt. Charges for pager unit taxable only if rented or sold
without corresponding communications service.
e. Department of Taxation Ruling dated January 26, 1981,
Va. State & Loc. Taxes (P-H) 23,085. Charges for sale and maintenance
of "canned" computer programs held taxable.
4. Inventory withdrawals - Commonwealth v. Miller-Morton
Co., 220 Va. 852, 263 S.E.2d 413 (1980). Since imposition of use tax requires
a "commercial transaction," no use tax may be imposed on materials withdrawn from inventory for use as samples until the materials are segregated
physically for such purposes. Department's attempt to impose Virginia use
tax on percentage of products manufactured here but then shipped to and
stored in other states held invalid. Manufactured goods maintained resale
exempt status until actual withdrawal from inventory. d. at 857-59, 263
S.E.2d at 416-18.
IV.

Capital Not Otherwise Taxed (CNOT) Tax.
A.

Legislation.

1. Nuisance - Repeal efforts continue. E.g., Senate Bill No.
547 (1981) (died in Senate).
2. Advances - Intercompany advances excluded from taxation
in "category 3" after 1979. Exemption applies only to advances to affiliates
that are not made as part of taxpayer's regular course of business. Otherwise,
advances and offsetting payables are taxed in "category 2." Va. Code § 58411A(3) & (4) (Supp. 1981).
3. Contractors- Contractors using percentage of completion
method of accounting report underbillings and overbillings in "category 2"
after 1980. Va. Code § 58-411B (Supp. 1981). Prior to that time, Department
argued that underbillings created taxable assets in "category 3," and offsetting
overbillings were wasted deduction.
B.

Litigation - Soon.
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C.

Proposed regulationsissued February 20, 1981.

1. Money - Exempt "money on hand and on deposit" includes checking accounts, savings accounts, and certificates of deposit, but
does not include commercial paper or master notes issued by bankholding
companies, banks, and others. Proposed CNOT Reg. § 8.58-41 1(4)A(9)(b).
No comment on money market funds or other investments subject to ready
conversion to cash. See Commonwealth v. Stringfellow, 173 Va. 284, 29192, 4 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1939) (credit balance with broker taxed as money,
not as debt instrument).
2. Usual course of business - The excess of bills and accounts
receivable over bills and accounts payable is taxable in "category 2." Va.
Code § 58-411A(3) (Supp. 1981). Proposed CNOT Reg. § 8.58-411(3)A requires both receivables and payables to be contracted "in the usual course of
the taxpayer's business and not for purposes of capital outlay." Proposed
regulations define "usual course of business" to mean directly related to the
acquisition, production, or sale of taxpayer's products or services. Proposed
CNOT Reg. § 8.58-411(3)A(1).
3. Valuation - Audit position is apparently that accounting
reserves will not be allowed in determining "actual value." Burden is on
taxpayer (in administrative appeal) to show that reserve for bad debts or
otherwise is necessary to reflect actual value. See Proposed CNOT Reg. §
8.58-411(3)E.
4. Evasion - Any conversion of property into nontaxable form
for purposes of "evading taxation" deemed voidable. Proposed CNOT Reg.
§ 8.58-421. Statute is much narrower. Va. Code § 58-421 (1974) (conversion
must occur within 30 days prior to first day of taxable year).
V.

Pending Virginia Tax Cases*.
A.

Income taxes.

1. General Electric Co. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court of
City of Richmond, Division I. Issue is whether income of a non-resident
DISC is subject to Virginia taxation by including its income with that of its
parent corporation. Stipulated facts are that GE DISC is a non-operating
commission DISC that does not do business in Virginia and is not subject to
Virginia income tax. Case will turn on meaning § 58-151.083, which permits
Department of Taxation to require a combined return when "any arrangements
exist in such a manner as to improperly reflect that business done or the
Virginia taxable income earned from business done in this State." Several
other pending cases await a final decision in GeneralElectric.
2. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Departmentof Taxation,
Circuit Court, City of Richmond, Division I. Petitions put in issue (a) the
DISC question under consideration in the General Electric case and (b) the
inclusion in Virginia taxable income of certain income that the taxpayer claims
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is allocable income under § 58-151.037 & 58-151.039 (only one petition
involves this issue).
3. E-Systems, Inc. v. Department of Taxation, Circuit Court
of the City of Richmond, Division I. Petition puts in issue (a) DISC question
under consideration in Ceneral Electric case and (b) inclusion in Virginia
taxable income of certain amounts that were recovered by taxpayer and that
were deducted previously on federal returns for years prior to the year in
which the taxpayer first became subject to the Virginia income tax.
4. H.B. Rowe & Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, Circuit Court
of the City of Richmond, Division I. Taxpayer's federal taxable income for
a prior year was adjusted by the IRS, and the taxpayer filed a claim for refund.
The claim was denied by the State Tax commissioner on the basis that the
claim for refund was not timely filed with 60 days from the final determination
made by the IRS.
5. AssociatedTransport,Inc. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court,
City of Richmond. Application, relating to years 1962-1966, was filed in
1968, was answered, and has remained dormant since then. The issues involve
the assertion that application of the apportionment formula to the interstate
trucking business of the taxpayer violates the due process and commerce
clauses. In addition, the inclusion of certain "passive income" in apportionable income is disputed.
6. Groom v. Commonwealth, petition for appeal filed by the
Commonwealth from the decision of the Circuit Court for Arlington County.
The issue involves the creditability of the District of Columbia's unincorporated business franchise tax against the individual's Virginia income tax
liability under § 58-151.015. During pendency of the Commonwealth's appeal,
the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the District's unincorporated business franchise tax was, in part, in violation of its Home Rule
Charter and refunded to the taxpayers herein those amounts sought to be
credited against the taxpayers' Virginia income tax liability. By joint motion
of counsel, the Commonwealth's petition was dismissed for mootness after
the payment of all the Commonwealth's delinquent assessments for the years
in question.
7. Hill v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court, County of Loudoun.
The issue is identical to that in the Groom case and deals with the creditability
of the District of Columbia's unincorporated business franchise tax against
Virginia income tax liability under § 58-151.015.
8. Mead Corp. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Circuit Court,
City of Richmond, Division I. The 4uestion raised involves the interpretation
of § 58-151.039. Both parties agree that the case of Champion Intirnational
Corp. v. Commonwealth controls dispositon of the legal issue involved. Certain computational difficulties, however, still may remain.
9. Quinn PatentDrawing Service, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court, County of Arlington. Application contests the inclusion of certain
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income generated from the sales of real estate and improvements located in
Washington, D.C., in apportionable income.
10. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court,
City of Richmond, Division I. The taxpayer contests the validity of § 58151.050, which details how the income of motor carriers is apportioned for
Virginia income tax purposes, asserting that as applied to its particular interstate trucking operation, the statute produces an unconstitutional result in
taxing more than Virginia's share of the company's income.
11. B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court, City
of Richmond, Division II. In a declaratory judgment proceeding, the taxpayer
contended that income earned in its interstate trucking business did not constitute income from Virginia sources under the Code of Virginia. The trial
court ruled in favor of the taxpayer. The Commonwealth is expected to file
a petition for appeal in November, 1981.
B.

Sales and Use Taxes.

1. E.B.C., Inc. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court of Wise County.
Taxpayer, a corporation formed to engage in mining and mineral extraction
as well as construction and land excavation, challenges the assessment of the
use tax on the purchase of certain pieces of equipment that it uses in its coal
operations and in unrelated earth moving and construction activities. The
Department issued the assessment based upon prorated usage between the
coal and construction activities. The taxpayer claims total exemption.
2. J.T. Newman v. Forst, Circuit Court of Lunenburg County.
Taxpayer, a trucking concern holding a contract carrier status, leased its trucks
to a common carrier. Taxpayer claims an exemption from the use tax assessment contending that the lease of his equipment to a common carrier
qualifies his concern for common carrier status and the attendant exemption.
3. PrincessAnne Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court of
the City of Virginia Beach. Taxpayer challenges a use tax assessment on
charges for "pay-TV movies" furnished to guests in their rooms, as well as
a tax on the equipment and movies that it purchases, claiming that it is
providing a nontaxable service.
4. Nelson M. Diehl v. Forst, Circuit Court, County of Rockingham. The taxpayer, a farmer in the business of raising cattle for sale at
wholesale, contends that certain retail sales of cattle, never more than 15 on
an annual basis, are exempt from sales and use tax as an occasional sale under
§ 58-441.6(m). The taxpayer also contends that he relied on certain oral advice
for interpretation of the occasional sale exemption.
5. Bruce Flournoy Motor Corp. v. Department of Taxation,
Circuit Court, City of Norfolk. The issues involve the use of the estimation
technique for the audit period and the inclusion of certain items in the tax
base, including warranties/maintenance contracts and certain items purchased
for either warranty work or rental car maintanance and repair.
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6. Harman Mining Corp. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court,
County of Buchanan. The taxpayer is engaged in the business of mining coal
for sale and alleges that taxes were assessed erroneously on certain machinery,
tools, and other materials utilized in his business.
7. Miller-Morton Co. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court, City
of Richmond, Division I, on remand from the Supreme Court of Virginia on
the issue of certain dual purpose items. Because of the trial court's ruling on
a threshold issue, the trial court did not entertain certain other legal issues.
These issues related to certain dual purpose items such as display stands and
containers that served two purposes: promotional purposes and packaging/
delivery purposes. Two legal arguments were raised by the taxpayer, disputed
by the Department of Taxation, and not decided below. These issues were
whether these items were resold by the taxpayer and whether the packaging
exemption granted by § 58-441.6 was met.
8. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court, City
of Richmond. The issues are similar, if not identical, to those involved in
the Miller-Morton case.
9. A.H. Robins Co. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court, City of
Richmond, Division I. The issues are similar, if not identical, to those involved
in the Miller-Morton case.
10. Nationwide Communications v. Commonwealth, Circuit
Court, City of Richmond, Division I. Application contests use tax assessment
imposed upon tangible personal property employed in the taxpayer's business.
The issue involves the applicability of the broadcasting exemption granted
by § 58-441.6(j) and the proration of use tax liability based on percentages of
exempt versus taxable use.
11. Derwood L. Runion v. Forst, Circuit Court, County of
Rockingham. The taxpayer asserts that in the operation of its business of
constructing agricultural buildings, equipping agricultural buildings, and selling equipment that was installed by others in agricultural buildings, it is not
liable for either the payment or the collection of sales taxes.
12. Ryan Homes, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court, City
of Richmond, Division I. The taxpayer is a construction contractor that also
is engaged in a manufacturing business. The dispute involves the Department's
interpretation of § 58-441.15, Regulation § 1-27, and Sales and Use Tax Circular
No. 4.
13. Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court,
County of Buchanan. The dispute centers on the taxability of various items
of tangible personal property purchased for use in the taxpayers' coal mining
operation. The trial court decided that the following items were exempted:
real estate construction materials used to build a coal preparation facility
(tipple), coal scoops, testing equipment, scales, methanometers, and first aid
equipment. The court ruled that these items were used directly in the exempted
activity under § 58-441.6. The trial court ruled that the following items were
taxable: repair parts and maintenance materials for trucks used to haul coal
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between the mine and the coal preparation facility, items used to build and
maintain haul roads in and around the mine site, and reclamation materials.
The court ruled that these items were not used directly in the exempted activity.
The Commonwealth filed a petition for appeal in November, 1981.
14. Graves v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court for the City of
Norfolk. Petition contests inclusion of certain "cash advances" in taxpayer's
taxable base or measure when the lump-sum method of reporting is elected
under § 1-41(b) of the Virginia Retail Sales and Use Tax Regulations. Court
has indicated that it will grant the Department's motion for summary judgment.
15. Ocean Sands Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, Circuit Court
of the City of Virginia Beach. Petition contests certain sales and use tax
assessments arrived at by using various methods of reconstructing taxpayer's
gross receipts. Federal cases for the same taxable periods involving assessment
of understated corporation income tax, together with fraud penalties, have
been decided partially in favor of the government in a decision reported at
41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 (1980).
C.

CNOT.

1. Atlantic Concrete Products v. Commonwealth & Roanoke
Ready Mix Concrete Corp. v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court of the City of
Roanoke. These companion cases involve challenges to assessments for CNOT
based upon intercorporate advances. Taxpayers challenge only the current
valuation of the advances and not their taxability under law.
2. PepsiCola Bottling Co. of Danville v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court of the City of Danville. Taxpayer challenges a CNOT assessment
on the value of goodwill and the value of "bottles-with-trade." Taxpayer
claims that goodwill is not among those intangible assets subject to the CNOT
and that it has no ownership interest in those soft drink bottles out of its
possession in circulation in the marketplace.
3. Leonard Smith Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc. v. Department
of Taxation, Circuit Court, City of Salem. The case involves several issues
including the taxation of equity in contracts, the definition of accounts payable
and accounts receivable, consideration of whether certain loans were accounts
payable when not incurred in the usual course of business, and whether sales
taxes are includible as accounts payable. A procedural objection in terms of
compliance with the requirements of § 58-1130 was raised by the Department
of Taxation.
4. Daily Press, Inc. v. Forst, Circuit Court of the City of
Newport News. Petition contests (a) valuation of receivables at their face
amount without deduction for an allowance or reserve for bad debts and (b)
inclusion in "capital" of certain intercompany advances between members
of an affiliated group.
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5. Hilton Enterprises Virginia, Inc. v. Forst, Circuit Court of
Prince William County. Petition contests inclusion of certain intercompany
advances in "capital" under § 58-410.
D.

Miscellaneous.

1. Holloman v. Department of Taxation, on appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court from the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division
11. The Department has appealed an adverse decision holding that North
Carolina farmers producing hogs for slaughter who use the services of a
contract carrier to transport their hogs to markets in the Commonwealth are
not subject to the Virginia Pork Excise Tax on slaughter hogs and feeder pigs
for hogs sold into slaughter in Virginia.
2. Continental Telephone Company of Virginia v. Commonwealth, Circuit Court, City of Richmond. Application for correction of recordation tax assessment. The issues involve the meaning of the terms "deed
of confirmation" as used in § 58-61 and "supplemental deed of trust" as used
in § 58-60. The taxpayer contends that the recordation of certain instruments
reflecting the consolidation of certain subsidiaries with its parent is exempt
from recordation tax as either a deed of confirmation, or supplemental deed
of trust, or both.

